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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 109th Congress adjourned in December 2006 without 
passing a federal shield law to protect journalists from subpoenas 
seeking the identities of confidential sources.  Continued Bush 
administration opposition to such a law1 and the crush of other 
business facing the “lame duck” Congress2 combined to lead the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to delay a vote on Senate Bill 2831,3 
the most recent Senate version of the proposed law, in September 
2006.4  The bill never came up for a committee vote in the Senate, 
and the House did not even hold a committee hearing on its 
version of the bill.5 
As 2006 came to a close, it also appeared unlikely that the 
Supreme Court of the United States would soon hear an appeal 
from reporters based on a claim that the First Amendment should 
afford journalists a privilege.  In November 2006, the Court 
declined to stay a Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling against 
the New York Times that opened the door for the government to 
subpoena reporters’ phone records to aid a leak investigation.6  
The Court took the unusual step of voting en banc on the motion, 
making it appear highly unlikely that it would grant certiorari to 
hear an appeal of the Second Circuit’s ruling.7  The Court also 
denied certiorari in June 2006 in the appeals of two reporters 
subpoenaed to testify by a former Los Alamos nuclear scientist 
 
 1. Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement: 
Hearing on S. 2831 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., United States Dep’t of Justice). 
 2. See Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Wrapping Up Session but Leaving Loose Ends, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A18 (reporting that Congress was preparing to adjourn for 
the year without passing several spending measures and other bills). 
 3. Free Flow of Information Act of 2006, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 4. Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Freezes Bill on Legal Protection for Reporters, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at A13. 
 5. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 6. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006) (denying stay of 
New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 7. Adam Liptak, Court Clears Way for Prosecutor to Review Records in Times Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A20. 
2
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suing the government for leaking private information about him to 
the media.8  The scientist, Dr. Wen Ho Lee, claimed that the 
government violated the Privacy Act of 19749 when investigators 
leaked information about him to reporters while he was under 
investigation for alleged espionage activities.10  Dr. Lee wanted the 
reporters to reveal the names of their sources for stories about him 
so he could press his civil suit more effectively.  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled against four reporters,11 
while a fifth reporter subpoenaed by Lee lost in his bid to quash 
the subpoena in a D.C. district court.12 
The Supreme Court’s decision was predictable given that Dr. 
Lee had settled out of court with the government and with the 
news organizations, thus making the appeal moot.13  Apparently, 
several news organizations paid part of the settlement in order to 
ensure that Lee would drop his demand that the reporters be held 
in contempt.14  A year earlier, the Court had also declined to review 
an appellate judgment against two reporters who hoped to avoid 
testifying in front of a grand jury investigating a leak that identified 
a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative.15  Several other 
 
 8. Thomas v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006); Drogin v. Wen Ho Lee, 
126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006) (“No agency shall disclose 
any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of 
communication to any person, or to another agency” except as required or 
specifically allowed by law). 
 10. Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006, at 
A1. 
 11. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 12. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 13. Charles Lane, In Wen Ho Lee Case, a Blow to Journalists After the Fact, 
WASH. POST, June 6, 2006, at A3; Liptak, supra note 10, at A1. 
 14. Lane, supra note 13, at A3; Liptak, supra note 10, at A1. 
 15. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied sub nom., United States v. Miller, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).  Time reporter 
Matthew Cooper and New York Times reporter Judith Miller were found in 
contempt for failing to cooperate with the investigation.  Id. at 976.  Time and 
Cooper eventually agreed to cooperate after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
but Miller did not and was held in contempt of court until the grand jury 
disbanded or she testified.  See Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name 
Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A1.  She was freed in September 2005 after her 
source released her from her promise of confidentiality.  See David Johnston & 
Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free from Jail; She Will Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, 
at A1.  Miller’s source, I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, 
subsequently was indicted on charges that he lied to investigators in the leak case.  
David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Aide Charged with Lying in Leak 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1.  A federal judge later quashed most of 
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cases are making their way through the court system,16 but since the 
Court last ruled in 1972 on whether journalists have a First 
Amendment right to decline to testify if doing so would identify a 
confidential source,17 it has denied certiorari in every similar case 
that has come its way.18 
Congress’s inability to bring a shield law to a vote during the 
2004–06 term,19 the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to revisit the 
question of whether journalists could claim protection from 
subpoenas under the First Amendment,20 and a rising tide of 
adverse lower court decisions21 do not exhaust all options for 
journalists who insist on protecting source identities.  If the First 
Amendment claim is a non-starter because of the Supreme Court’s 
1972 opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes,22 and a statutory privilege 
remains unavailable at least until sometime during this session of 
Congress, there is still a question as to whether journalists enjoy a 
federal common law privilege.  The Court might be more willing to 
hear arguments on a case that tied protection for journalists and 
 
Libby’s subpoenas of the news media for notes and other material for his trial, but 
let stand a subpoena for drafts of a Matthew Cooper story about Cooper’s grand 
jury appearance.  United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (denying reporters’ motion to quash subpoenas for testimony about sources 
for stories about grand jury testimony in regard to steroid use among Major 
League Baseball players); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, No. 06-16403, 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23315 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006) (denying appeal of freelance 
videographer who was held in contempt for refusing to turn over footage from 
violent protest in San Francisco to federal grand jury investigating destruction of 
police car). 
 17. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 18. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). 
     19.  See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
     20.  See, e.g., Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied sub nom., Thomas v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006); Drogin v. Wen Ho 
Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 
964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005). 
 21. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (denying appeal of 
television reporter who refused to reveal source for surveillance video he obtained 
and aired in apparent violation of gag order in public corruption case); McKevitt 
v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting existence of journalist’s 
privilege in case in which American reporters’ tapes of interviews with prosecution 
witness were subpoenaed in a Northern Ireland terrorism trial). 
 22. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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their sources to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501 and the 
common law, which Rule 501 directs courts to use in the 
recognition of new privileges.23  A 1996 Supreme Court case that 
recognized a privilege for psychiatric social workers, Jaffee v. 
Redmond,24 offers some encouragement for journalists because the 
Court’s decision in favor of the privilege relied in large measure on 
the fact that the states were unanimous in their support for the 
privilege.25  Similarly, the states are nearly unanimous about the 
existence of a journalist’s privilege.26  Asking the Supreme Court, 
however, to recognize a common-law journalist’s privilege also 
carries risks, in large part because journalists, unlike the social 
workers in Jaffee, are not licensed by the government, making it 
difficult to define a class of persons to whom the privilege would 
apply. 
This article will examine the pros and cons of pinning the 
hopes of journalists who want to protect sources without risking 
punishment for contempt of court on a federal common-law 
privilege.  Part II of this article will briefly discuss the history of the 
journalist’s privilege after 1972 and discuss the extent to which 
federal and state courts have relied upon the common law in 
protecting journalists and their sources.  In Part III, the article will 
examine FRE 501, which was created in 1975, three years after 
Branzburg was decided, and which forms the basis for federal 
privilege law in the last thirty years.  In Part IV, the article will 
analyze the Jaffee decision and other federal court decisions arising 
from FRE 501.  Part V will discuss factors that weigh in favor of 
recognizing a common-law journalist’s privilege based on FRE 501 
and court decisions interpreting it.  Part VI will discuss the pitfalls 
of relying upon common law to clear up the muddle that federal 
journalist’s privilege law has become.  Part VII will analyze the pros 
and cons of a common-law journalist’s privilege and will contrast 
them with the statutory protection that would be provided by the 
various shield bills introduced in the 109th Congress. 
II. JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE LAW SINCE 1972 
In Branzburg v. Hayes,27 the Supreme Court rejected, by a 5–4 
 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 24. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 25. Id. at 12–13. 
 26. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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vote, the position of three reporters that the First Amendment 
shielded them from testifying before grand juries investigating 
crimes.28  While acknowledging that newsgathering needed “some” 
First Amendment protection to keep freedom of expression from 
being “eviscerated,”29 the Court was unwilling to burden the lower 
courts with a voyage toward an “uncertain destination.”30  That 
uncertainty, the Court said, would be a natural result of forcing 
lower courts to do a case-by-case analysis of whether subpoenas 
directed at reporters should be enforced.31  The Court noted that a 
qualified privilege would also hinder a grand jury’s efforts to find 
the truth and bring criminals to justice.32  The majority also found 
no basis for granting journalists a right that other citizens did not 
enjoy when called to provide relevant evidence to a grand jury.33 
In what has turned out to be a pivotal concurring opinion, 
however, Justice Lewis Powell felt it necessary to emphasize the 
narrowness of the majority opinion.34  While the majority opinion 
found that journalists had no First Amendment right to refuse to 
testify to grand juries when they had witnessed crimes or received 
confessions and the grand juries were investigating specific crimes, 
 
 28. Branzburg was a consolidation of four cases involving three reporters who 
had declined to reveal confidential sources to grand juries.  Paul Branzburg of the 
Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal had been subpoenaed by two grand juries in 
that state after he wrote stories about drug dealers and users.  Id. at 667–70.  
Kentucky’s highest court twice rejected his attempts to quash the subpoenas, 
finding that the state shield law did not apply to eyewitness accounts of criminal 
activity.  See Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).  Paul Pappas, a New England television reporter, spent 
several hours with members of the Black Panthers in their headquarters in New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, after a racial disturbance in that city but never filed a 
story.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.  Nevertheless, he was subpoenaed by a grand jury 
investigating Black Panther activities, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court found that he was not protected by any state common-law privilege.  Id. at 
673–74; see also In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).  Earl Caldwell, a New 
York Times reporter based in California, was subpoenaed by a grand jury 
investigating the Black Panthers, whose national headquarters was in Oakland.  
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1970).  Caldwell regularly 
covered the group’s activities.  Id.  In Caldwell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit eventually ruled in his favor, finding that he should not have to 
appear before the grand jury because of a First Amendment privilege.  Branzburg, 
408 U.S. at 679; see also Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1086. 
 29. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. 
 30. Id. at 703. 
 31. Id. at 703–05. 
 32. Id. at 686–90. 
 33. Id. at 703–05. 
 34. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Justice Powell said that if a journalist was harassed or her testimony 
would have no relevance to the investigation, she could seek relief 
in the courts.35 
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justices William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall, filed a dissent.36  According to the dissent, in 
order to protect the free flow of information to the public and to 
keep reporters from being “annexed” as government 
investigators,37 the government should have to show that it had a 
compelling need for a journalist’s information; that the 
information was relevant to the case; and that the information was 
not available elsewhere.38  In a separate dissent, Justice William O. 
Douglas argued that journalists should enjoy an absolute privilege 
protecting them from government subpoenas.39 
The Court’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
largely focused on whether journalists had any First Amendment 
right to refuse to cooperate with otherwise valid grand jury 
investigations.  The majority noted vaguely that newsgathering had 
“some” First Amendment protection,40 but not to the extent of 
excusing journalists from the duties demanded of all citizens to 
provide relevant evidence to criminal investigations.41  The 
dissenters suggested that denying journalists the First Amendment 
right to protect the identities of confidential sources would lead to 
an infringement of free expression.  Justice Stewart’s dissent 
constructed a logical syllogism: if there was no privilege, at least 
some sources with information important to the public interest 
would refuse to share it with reporters.  If that happened, stories 
based on that information would never be published and the free 
flow of information to the public would be cut off, literally, at the 
source.42  Justice Douglas, in arguing for a virtually absolute 
privilege, focused on the chilling effect that a lack of privilege 
would have on both sources and journalists, decreasing the press’s 
ability to check abuses of government power.43 
Both dissenting opinions alluded to or foreshadowed various 
 
 35. Id. at 709–10. 
 36. Id. at 725–52 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 725. 
 38. Id. at 743. 
 39. Id. at 712–13 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 41. Id. at 690. 
 42. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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theories about freedom of speech and the press that were popular 
in the second half of the twentieth century.  Justice Stewart’s 
concern for the free flow of information to the public suggested 
traces of both Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-government theory44 and 
its corollary: the idea that the press and public have a “right to 
know.”45  Meiklejohn is famous for suggesting that free speech and 
self-government are inexorably linked because so many decisions in 
a democracy require wise voters to make wise decisions, which can 
only happen if voters are fully aware of all the pros and cons 
regarding public issues and public officials.46  The “right-to-know” 
corollary suggests that the press needs access to government-held 
information so that it can inform the public of what its government 
is doing.47 
Both the Stewart and Douglas dissents, with their emphases on 
preserving press autonomy so that the press can act as a check on 
government power, foreshadowed Professor Vincent Blasi’s 
“checking value” theory.48  A few years after Branzburg, Blasi argued 
that a primary purpose of the First Amendment’s speech, press, 
assembly, and petition clauses is to provide the press and public 
with the means to check government power.49  The link between 
the Branzburg dissents and Blasi’s theory is clearer in light of a 
speech made by Justice Stewart in 1974, shortly after the Watergate 
scandal led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation.  Justice 
Stewart argued that the press should properly be thought of as a 
“Fourth Estate” with a distinct institutional role as a watchdog over 
the three official branches of government.50  He did not suggest 
that the press should therefore always win its battles with 
government over access or privilege issues, but rather argued that 
the press clause gave the press the right to challenge government.51 
While much of the pro-privilege argument shows up in the 
Branzburg dissents, either directly or as subtext, it is worthwhile to 
 
 44. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 3 (1948). 
 45. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: 
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1. 
 46. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 44, at 26–27. 
 47. See generally Emerson, supra note 45; see also KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW 16–17 (1956). 
 48. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). 
 51. Id. at 636. 
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note that the majority opinion did not leave the press entirely 
helpless.  Justice Byron White, writing for himself and on behalf of 
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis 
Powell, and William Rehnquist, noted that Congress was free to 
create a statutory journalist’s privilege and the states were free to 
do likewise.52  The Court also noted that state courts were free to 
interpret their own constitutions as they saw fit to recognize such a 
privilege.53 
Largely missing from the discussion of any possible basis for a 
journalist’s privilege was mention of whether a privilege might be 
recognized at common law.  In at least three instances, Justice 
White’s majority opinion cited the lack of any recognition of a 
journalist’s privilege in common law to support the majority’s view 
that such a privilege is not favored or necessary.54  There was no 
suggestion that one possible source of relief for journalists could be 
a privilege recognized at common law, but neither was there a 
direct statement barring such a privilege. 
A. State Privilege Law 
In subsequent years, protections for journalists and their 
sources have come in a variety of forms in both state and federal 
jurisdictions.  At present, thirty-one states and the District of 
Columbia provide statutory protection to journalists,55 while New 
 
 52. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 685 (“At common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the 
existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential 
information to a grand jury.”); id. at 693 (“The available data indicate that some 
newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some informants are 
particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is held by 
this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas, but the 
evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the 
flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and 
constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.”); id. at 698 
(“As noted previously, the common law recognized no such privilege, and the 
constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958.”). 
 55. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2005); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–.390 (2006); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003 & Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 
(2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995 & Supp. 2007); COLO REV. STAT.                
§ 13-90-119 (2005 & Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (Lexis 2007); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (1999 & Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to           
-4704 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1999 & Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 
(1995 & Supp. 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901 to -909 (2003 & Supp. 2006); 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1 to -2 (1999 & Supp. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.                  
§ 421.100 (West 2005); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts. 1451–1459 (West 1999 & Supp. 
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Mexico accomplishes the same thing with a formal court rule.56  
Although the degree of protection varies considerably, it is safe to 
say that all of the statutes, or “shield laws,” provide at least qualified 
protection to journalists seeking to protect the identities of 
confidential sources.  About two-thirds of the statutes also protect a 
journalist’s work product, such as unpublished photographs, notes, 
audio tapes, or video outtakes.57 
In the eighteen states without shield laws, most recognize 
either a constitutional privilege or a common-law privilege.58  
Appellate courts in three states—Mississippi,59 Utah,60 and 
Wyoming—have not considered the question.  Hawaii appellate 
courts have not considered the question since eleven years before 
Branzburg was decided.61  Texas appellate courts have found no 
 
2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS     
§ 767.5a (2000 & Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–.025 (2006); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1999); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 49.275 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.13 (West 1994 & Supp. 
2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT.             
§ 8-53.11 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.          
§§ 2739.04, .12 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1993 & Supp. 2007); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–.540 (2003 & Supp. 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1997 & Supp. 2006); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000 & 
Supp. 2006). 
 56. N.M. RULES ANN. § 11-514 (2005). 
 57. See supra note 55, with regard to statutes in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
 58. See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985) (state and 
federal constitutions); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977) (state 
constitution); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978) (federal constitution); 
Sinnott v. Boston Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988) (common law); State ex 
rel. Classic III, Inc., v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (federal 
constitution); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (state 
constitution); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974) (federal constitution); 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974) (federal constitution); Senear 
v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1978) (common law); Zelenka v. 
State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978) (state and federal constitutions). 
 59. But see JAMES C. GOODALE, 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2006, at 1085–86 
(PRACTISING L. INST., ed. 2006) (noting that Mississippi trial courts had recognized 
a qualified journalist’s privilege in unreported cases). 
 60. But see Edward L. Carter, Note and Comment, Reporter’s Privilege in Utah, 
18 BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (2003) (discussing trial court decisions in Utah that have 
recognized a journalist’s privilege grounded in the First Amendment). 
 61. In re Goodfader’s Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961) (rejecting journalist’s 
attempt to quash subpoena). 
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privilege exists when reporters are subpoenaed in criminal cases.62  
In civil cases, the law in that state is unclear.63  Several of the states 
without shield laws have extended the journalist’s privilege to cover 
nonconfidential material,64 while others have specifically rejected 
that extension.65 
Among the states without shield laws, Massachusetts and 
Washington have been the most direct in attributing journalists’ 
protection to the common law, while most other states have cited 
state or federal constitutional concerns.66  In 1985, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declined a task force 
recommendation that it adopt a press shield as a court rule, saying 
that it preferred to allow protections for the media to develop 
through precedent.67  The court said that the evolution of a 
journalist’s privilege through common-law development would be 
more likely to be “flexible enough” to maintain a proper balance 
between the public interest in free expression and fair adjudication 
than adoption of a rule.68  The court noted that “[t]he common law 
process will result in less static and dogmatic principles” than would 
be likely with a court-adopted rule.69  In subsequent cases, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized a common-law, 
qualified journalist’s privilege in several cases.70 
 
 62. Burnette v. State, No. 01-00-00403-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3944 (Tex. 
App. June 14, 2001); Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 
(en banc); State ex rel. Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1994). 
 63. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding 
television station could not claim a privilege for nonconfidential outtakes of video 
shot at scene of accident and subpoenaed in civil case but leaving open question 
of whether confidential information would be privileged in similar circumstances). 
 64. See Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1987); Lamberto v. 
Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1982); State ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass’n v. Ranson, 
488 S.E.2d 5 (W. Va. 1997); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 
1989); Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 65. See State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996); In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 
722 (Me. 1990); State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988); Comm. v. Corsetti, 438 
N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1982); CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1982). 
 66. See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information 
in States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 258–64 (2002). 
 67. Promulgation of Rules Regarding the Protection of Confidential News 
Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 156 (1985). 
 68. Id. at 158. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Comm. v. Tam S. Bui, 645 N.E.2d 689 (Mass. 1995); In re John Doe Grand 
Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991); Sinnott v. Boston Ret. Bd., 524 
N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988).  But see Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 
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In 1982, the Washington Supreme Court recognized a 
common-law journalist’s privilege71 and provided a relatively 
detailed roadmap of how it reached its decision.72  In Senear v. Daily 
Journal-American,73 the Washington Supreme Court first noted that a 
journalist’s privilege was not favored in the common law.  The 
court cited evidence law scholar John Henry Wigmore for the 
proposition that any privilege established by a court of law must 
meet four conditions: 
(1) The communication must originate in a confidence 
that it will not be disclosed; (2) the element of 
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the 
relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the 
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communication must be greater than the benefit 
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.74 
The court concluded that the first two conditions existed in 
regard to a journalist’s privilege.75  As for the third condition, the 
court said that, while it might not have existed in earlier times, “it 
does exist with considerable force today.”76  The court said that the 
complex nature of modern society, the need for an informed 
citizenry, and “the increasing importance of journalists to convey 
information to citizens” meant that the relationship between 
journalists and sources was one that should be “sedulously 
fostered.”77  As for Wigmore’s fourth condition, the court spent 
little time determining that, with respect to civil litigation at least, 
the injury from failing to establish the privilege would be greater 
than any benefits from requiring reporters to testify.78 
Later, the court reflected upon the nature of the common law.  
It is not, the court said, a set of unchanging doctrines: 
 
667 (Mass. 2005) (upholding default judgments against newspaper and reporter 
for refusing to reveal confidential source to plaintiff in libel and privacy action), 
cert. denied by Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 126 S. Ct. 397 (2005). 
 71. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180, 1180 (Wash. 1982). 
 72. Id. at 1181–84. 
 73. Id., 641 P.2d 1180. 
 74. Id. at 1182 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 
1961)). 
 75. Id. at 1183. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (citing Haugland v. Smythe, 169 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1946)). 
 78. Id. at 1183. 
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It is a living, vital body of law which should address the 
problems of the day.  When long standing rules of court 
and the administration of justice no longer have merit, 
they should be changed.  The flexibility of the common 
law allows the law, by the action of the court, to change.  
All of the conditions we have held necessary for 
establishing a common law qualified privilege exist.  The 
time has come to change and we do so.79 
It should be noted, however, that this was not a unanimous 
decision.  One justice on the Washington Supreme Court argued 
that the court should have recognized a privilege grounded in the 
First Amendment.80  Two justices dissented, arguing that if such a 
privilege were to be created, it was up to the legislature to do so.81  
The difference of opinion on the Washington Supreme Court is a 
microcosm of the difference of opinion generally about the origins 
of the journalist’s privilege. 
B. Federal Privilege Law 
By contrast to the two states that have specifically adopted 
common-law journalist’s privileges, federal courts that have alluded 
to a common-law journalist’s privilege have been largely silent on 
how and why they determined its origins.  Most federal appellate 
courts have found that a privilege protecting journalists from 
revealing confidential sources exists.82  Most of those courts have 
grounded the journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment, but 
others have suggested that the privilege is a creation of common 
law.83  Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
rejected the existence of any type of journalist’s privilege in federal 
law.84  The Seventh Circuit more recently rejected the existence of a 
privilege covering work product and questioned other courts’ 
finding of a privilege for confidential material but did not decide 
 
 79. Id. at 1184 (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 1184–85 (Utter, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 1185 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). 
 82. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 
(1st Cir. 1980); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Riley v. City of 
Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 780 F.2d 
1134 (4th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 
1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).  
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 84. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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that question.85  The Second, Third, and Ninth circuits have 
recognized a privilege that extends to work product in certain 
situations,86 while the Fifth, in addition to the Sixth and Seventh, 
has rejected such an extension.87 
Particularly in the federal system, it may be folly to attempt to 
treat constitutional and common-law privileges as separate entities.  
Common law is often described as “judge-made law” that is created 
by case decisions and extended through precedent.88  That is also a 
fairly accurate description of the way constitutional law develops.  
In fact, some commentators have suggested that the Constitution is 
largely a product of common-law thinking, particularly in the way 
that it describes judicial power in Article III.89  For the moment, at 
least, it is useful to note that whatever similarities exist in common-
law and constitutional law decision making do not necessarily mean 
that both are equal as sources of law. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has been the 
most direct and specific federal appellate court in grounding a 
journalist’s privilege in common law.  In Riley v. City of Chester,90 a 
Third Circuit panel determined that a lower court erred in finding 
a reporter in contempt for refusing to reveal her sources to a 
plaintiff in a civil action in which the reporter was not a party.91  
The decision came only a few years after the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, including FRE 501 regarding 
privileges.92  The court in Riley determined that FRE 501’s guidance 
to courts to act in regard to “reason and experience” in developing 
privilege law should initially lead to the First Amendment.93  The 
court determined that Branzburg’s suggestion that the First 
Amendment protected newsgathering94 and the obvious links 
between effective newsgathering, confidential sources, and an 
 
 85. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 86. See Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999); Shoen v. 
Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 
146–47 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 87. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 88. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 10 (2003). 
 89. Id. at 18–19. 
 90. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See infra Part III. 
 93. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 94. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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informed public weighed in favor of the privilege.95  The court also 
noted that, while it did not have to follow state law in a federal-
question case, it could not ignore the Pennsylvania public policy 
decision to create a shield law.96  The court determined that the 
strong public policy supporting “the unfettered communication to 
the public of information, comment and opinion” and the First 
Amendment aspects of the policy led it to recognize a qualified 
journalist’s privilege.97 
A year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
cited Riley approvingly in finding that a lower court needed to 
revise its formula for determining whether a libel defendant 
newspaper must disclose confidential sources to the plaintiff.98  The 
court said that the resolution of the dispute did not “lie in any 
black letter pronouncement or broad scale confrontation between 
First Amendment and reputation interests.”99  This would seem to 
suggest that with no statutory guidance and no need to resort to a 
constitutional showdown, the answer to the privilege question lay in 
the common law.  But the court then suggested that the proper 
solution to the issue at hand would be an application of federal civil 
procedure rules coupled with a “heightened sensitivity” to First 
Amendment implications of compelling disclosure.100  While this 
might be characterized as a common-law approach, it would appear 
to more closely resemble a constitutional-law approach. 
Two other circuits have alluded to the common law as the basis 
of a journalist’s privilege, one prior to the adoption of FRE 501 in 
1975 and the other immediately after.  In the 1972 case Baker v.      
F & F Investment,101 the Second Circuit ruled in favor of a reporter 
trying to avoid discovery of his confidential sources in a civil rights 
lawsuit in which he was not a party.102  The panel seemed to 
anticipate FRE 501 when it said that federal courts, absent a 
statutory journalist’s privilege, should look to judicial precedent 
(experience) and “a well-informed judgment as to the proper 
 
 95. Riley, 612 F.2d at 714–15. 
 96. Id. at 715 (citing In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1963), and alluding to   
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1976)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (1st 
Cir. 1980). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 102. See id. 
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federal public policy” affecting each case (reason).103  The court 
also noted approvingly that the trial judge considered the public 
policy of New York, where the reporter lived, and Illinois, the 
forum state for the underlying civil rights action, both of which had 
adopted statutory journalist’s privileges.104  But later in the opinion, 
the court closely ties the privilege to the First Amendment rather 
than the common law.105 
In the 1975 case Lewis v. United States,106 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a reporter could not withhold evidence from a federal grand 
jury investigating crimes.107  The court determined that Branzburg 
would make it difficult, at best, to argue for a common-law privilege 
that would protect a reporter subpoenaed by a grand jury.108 
In short, journalists have found limited protection for their 
sources—and themselves—in a hodge-podge of constitutional, 
statutory, and common-law locations.  In the federal system, 
however, the constitutional protection is uneven and the statutory 
protection is unavailable so far.109  Could the common law of 
evidence provide a basis for a more consistent federal privilege 
recognized by the Supreme Court?  Perhaps, but first, the Court 
would have to determine the meaning of FRE 501 in this context. 
III. RULE 501 
American journalists have been arguing for about as long as 
there have been reporters that they should not have to reveal their 
sources.110  That history is relatively short compared to the length of 
time that judges in England and the United States have required 
people with relevant evidence to provide it to courts of law.  
 
 103. See id. at 781. 
 104. Id. at 781–82. 
 105. Id. at 785.  “It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our 
constitutional way of life, that where the press remains free so too will a people 
remain free.  Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or, more subtly, by 
indirect restraints.  Happily, the First Amendment tolerates neither . . . .”  Id. 
 106. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 238. 
 109. See infra notes 384–399 and accompanying text (regarding proposed 
federal shield law). 
 110. See Aaron David Gordon, Protection of News Sources: The History and 
Legal Status of the Newsman’s Privilege (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin) (on file with Herman B. Wells Library, Indiana 
University) (tracing instances of journalists resisting subpoenas back to the mid-
1800s). 
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Wigmore writes that the English tradition of compelling witnesses 
dates to at least 1742, when apparently the question of whether 
recalcitrant witnesses could be forced to testify became a matter of 
public debate.111  Wigmore quotes Lord Hardwicke as saying in 
Parliament “that the public has a right to every [person’s] 
evidence.”112 
There also is a long history of people trying to escape the 
obligation to provide evidence for professional or personal reasons.  
Wigmore noted that until the practice was effectively outlawed in 
the eighteenth century, British courts often excused as witnesses 
people who claimed they had “obligations of honor” to keep 
confidences.113  In both England and this country, efforts have been 
made for many years through statutes and common-law 
development to balance the needs of courts and recalcitrant 
witnesses through privileges.  Wigmore, after stating his four-part 
test for the recognition of privileges,114 also expressed a disdain for 
most privileges created by statute or common law as impediments 
to the discovery of truth through litigation.115 
But over time, privileges have developed through common 
and statutory law in all or most states to protect relationships 
between medical doctors and patients,116 psychotherapists and 
patients,117 and, in a few states, even accountants and clients,118 in 
addition to the widely recognized privileges for attorneys and 
clients,119 clergy and penitents,120 and spouses.121 
Given the conflict between the need for evidence and the ways 
in which privileges have developed, it is perhaps not surprising that 
one commentator has said that “[t]he law of evidence in the 
United States is probably the most complex, maddening, and rule-
bound in the entire world.”122  There is probably a great deal of 
truth to that, but Congress made an attempt to bring order to 
 
 111. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 2005). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. § 2286. 
 114. Id. § 2285. 
 115. Id. § 2286. 
 116. Id. §§ 2380–2391. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. § 2286. 
 119. Id. §§ 2290–2329. 
 120. Id. §§ 2394–2396. 
 121. Id. §§ 2332–2341. 
 122. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 266 
(2002). 
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chaos by codifying federal evidence rules in 1975.123  FRE 501, on 
privileges, states: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the 
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by 
the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light 
of reason and experience.  However, in civil actions and 
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or 
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in 
accordance with State law.124 
As Edward J. Imwinkelried noted in summarizing the history of 
FRE 501, it was the result of a political compromise in Congress.125  
FRE 501 replaced a set of specific rules regarding privilege that 
were in the text of a Supreme Court Advisory Committee report 
that raised Congress’s concern in the midst of the Watergate 
scandal, which drew attention to executive privilege issues.126  In 
providing a more open-ended framework for privilege law, FRE 501 
gives federal courts the power to define the boundaries of privilege 
law but “is devoid of even a suggestion as to how the courts are to 
exercise that power.”127 
According to Imwinkelried, the text of FRE 501 leaves open 
the possibility that courts will interpret the rule to either foreclose 
the development or expansion of privileges or encourage such 
development or expansion.128  Imwinkelried contends that the 
context of FRE 501, among other evidence rules that favor 
admission of evidence, argues against both interpretations and 
toward an interpretation of FRE 501 that would allow new or 
expanded privileges, but only after a very cautious analysis by the 
 
 123. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
 124. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 125. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual 
Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 514 (1994). 
 126. Id. at 512–14. 
 127. Id. at 515. 
 128. Id. at 524, 529–30. 
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court.129 
FRE 501 is not without its critics, many of whom have 
suggested that it maintains a status quo full of “confusion and 
frustration”130 and fails to establish a “procedural methodology” or 
“substantive policy” for the courts with regard to analyzing privilege 
claims.131  Federal appellate case law since FRE 501’s adoption 
would seem to bear out Imwinkelried’s observation that there are 
at least two ways to interpret FRE 501: restrictively and 
expansively.132 
 
 129. Id. at 542–43. 
 130. See Kenneth R. Tucker, Note, Did Congress Err in Failing to Set Forth Codified 
Rules Governing Privileged Relationships and Resulting Communications?, 72 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 181, 204–06 (1994). 
 131. See M. Leigh Svetanics, Note, Beyond “Reason and Experience:” The Supreme 
Court Adopts a Broad Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 41 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 719, 720 (1997). 
 132. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(finding that governor’s chief legal counsel could claim attorney-client privilege in 
connection to criminal investigation of governor); In re Sealed Case (Med. 
Records), 381 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (vacating district court discovery order 
until that court determines whether records of man committed to state care 
contain privileged mental-health files); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 
(7th Cir. 2004) (declining to create privilege for medical records at common law 
but finding that privacy interests outweigh government’s interest in late-term 
abortion records); United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that trial court erred in allowing defendant’s psychiatrist to testify and declining to 
create “dangerous patient” exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege, but 
finding that error was harmless because defendant was acquitted on charge 
relevant to psychiatrist’s testimony); United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 
2003) (finding that spousal privilege did not prevent defendant’s wife from 
voluntarily testifying against defendant); United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (finding there is no “dangerous patient” exception to federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and affirming lower court’s quashing of 
subpoena for psychiatrist); Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining 
to recognize “novel” privileges that would protect agency records about juveniles 
even though such privileges were part of state law); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that psychotherapist-patient 
privilege should be construed to contain “crime-fraud exception” and affirming 
lower court order to have psychiatrists testify to grand jury); In re Medtronic, Inc., 
184 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that federal law protecting records of 
pacemaker manufacturer that identify patients did not illegally create a new 
privilege); United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
Alcoholics Anonymous telephone operators were not privileged in 
communications with defendant); In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that White House counsel cannot claim attorney-client privilege in 
relation to criminal investigation of government officials); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that White House 
may not claim attorney-client privilege in regard to grand jury investigation of 
government officials); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scarce), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 
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IV. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF FRE 501 
By and large, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create 
new privileges under FRE 501, but it also has not rushed to limit 
privileges already recognized.  So, for example, in University of 
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,133 the 
Court declined to create a privilege for colleges’ peer review 
materials related to faculty tenure decisions.134  The Court said it 
was “disinclined” to exercise its FRE 501 authority “expansively” 
and suggested that the creation of the privilege that the university 
sought was a “legislative function.”135  This opinion seems to be in 
line with an earlier decision declining to recognize a “legislative 
acts” privilege for a state legislator accused of misusing his office.136  
In that decision, the Court took note of the legislative history of 
FRE 501 and stated that no one had suggested the kind of privilege 
the legislator sought before the specific privilege recommendations 
were abandoned in favor of FRE 501.137  While this fact was not 
dispositive, the Court said, it did highlight the fact that the 
legislative function test “was not thought to be either indelibly 
ensconced in our common law or an imperative of federalism.”138 
But when a privilege was “ensconced in our common law,” the 
Court was reluctant to let it be nibbled upon.  In a 1998 case, 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States,139 the Court determined that the 
attorney-client privilege should survive the death of the client.140  It 
turned back an attempt by an independent counsel to pierce the 
shield around Clinton aide Vince Foster’s conversation with his 
attorney nine days before Foster’s suicide.141  The Court noted that 
the attorney-client privilege is “one of the oldest recognized 
privileges in the law” and that it was being asked to narrow it in a 
 
1993) (declining to recognize common-law “scholar’s privilege” for student 
subpoenaed by grand jury); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dtd. Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 
223 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(finding that spouse could voluntarily testify against husband without violating 
husband’s rights as long as testimony was limited to observations and not 
communication). 
 133. 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 189. 
 136. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). 
 137. Id. at 367–68. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 401–03. 
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way contrary to case law.142  FRE 501 did not require that a privilege 
must exist untouched for all time once it was created, the Court 
said, but it did require a stronger showing than the Independent 
Counsel had made to overturn it.143 
Given the Court’s embrace of custom and tradition in other 
privilege cases since the adoption of FRE 501, it is not easy to 
explain the Court’s ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond.144  But Jaffee offers 
perhaps the best hope for journalists wanting to persuade the 
Supreme Court to recognize a common-law privilege. 
A. Jaffee v. Redmond 
In 1996, the Supreme Court crafted a test that could be 
utilized by the federal courts to create federal common-law 
privileges.145  The test requires an analysis of the importance of the 
public and private interests served by the privilege, measured 
against the public interest in forcing disclosure of evidence, and 
consideration of the extent to which the states had adopted a 
similar privilege through common or statutory law.146  The majority 
held “that confidential communications between a licensed 
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or 
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”147  The case, however, dealt with 
counseling sessions with a state licensed social worker and not a 
licensed psychotherapist.148 
In expanding the privilege to cover the licensed social worker, 
the Court looked at several factors to determine whether the 
privilege served important private and public interests.149  First, the 
Court found it important that social workers provided a significant 
portion of the mental health services in the United States.150  
Secondly, it was significant that the services provided by social 
workers serve the same public goals as psychotherapists.151  Finally, 
the fact that a majority of states had provided privilege protection 
 
 142. Id. at 410. 
 143. Id. at 410–11. 
 144. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 145. Id. at 9–14. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 15. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
 149. Id. at 15–16. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 16. 
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to licensed social workers within the framework of the 
psychotherapist privilege was another factor that weighed in favor 
of recognizing a privilege under FRE 501.152  Interwoven in the 
Court’s dialogue on the extension of the privilege to licensed social 
workers was an economic argument.153  If the Court limited the 
privilege to psychotherapists, then the protection for those seeking 
or needing counseling would be limited to those who could afford 
the services of the psychotherapists, thereby excluding large 
portions of society from the benefits of the privilege.154 
The Court rejected the lower court’s balancing test.155  The 
Court was very concerned with the negative impact that such a test 
could have in application.156  In particular, the Court wanted those 
who sought counseling to be able to predict that their statements 
made in confidence would be excluded from federal proceedings 
without being subject to the whims of judges.157  Thus, the Court 
held that a near-absolute privilege would be recognized to promote 
certainty in the application of the privilege.158 
Outside of the holding and these two clarifications, the Court 
did not see a need to fully define the parameters of the new 
privilege.159  The Court did throw in one significant piece of dictum 
for future courts to decipher.160  In footnote nineteen, the Court 
seemed to envision a dangerous patient exception to the near-
absolute privilege that it had created.161  As for future privileges 
created under the auspices of Jaffee, the Court stated that it would 
be better to allow the courts creating the new privileges on a case-
by-case basis to shape the details of the privilege in a similar 
manner.162 
The dissent in Jaffee, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, 
demonstrated a reluctance to create new privileges because of the 
 
 152. Id. at 16–17. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 17. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 17–18. 
 158. Id.  “An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but 
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege 
at all.”  Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
 159. Id. at 18. 
 160. Id. at 18 n.19. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 18. 
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public’s need for evidence.163  The dissent was very critical of the 
majority opinion’s terse extension of the psychotherapist privilege 
to licensed social workers.164  Justice Scalia likened this extension to 
an extension of the attorney-client privilege to accountants or tax 
advisors.165  He was very uncomfortable with the level of training of 
social workers when compared with either psychotherapists or 
lawyers.166 
B. Jaffee’s Progeny in the Lower Courts 
The lower federal courts have utilized the Jaffee framework in a 
variety of ways.  Some courts have taken an expansive view of the 
privilege and provided protection to counselors outside of the 
scope of the original Jaffee ruling.  Other courts have been stricter 
when applying a psychotherapist privilege.  Generally, what the 
majority in Jaffee envisioned would happen has occurred: further 
clarification and definition in the lower courts on a case-by-case 
basis. 
1. Who Qualifies for the Psychotherapist Privilege 
The privilege created in Jaffee extended to licensed 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers.167  One aspect of the 
scope of the privilege left unanswered by the Jaffee Court was who 
else might be covered by the psychotherapist privilege.  Numerous 
subsequent cases have been litigated to help further define the 
scope of coverage for this privilege.168 
a. Marriage Counselors 
The district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin curtly 
extended the psychotherapist privilege to include marriage 
 
 163. See id. at 18–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164. See id. at 20. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 28–30. 
 167. Id. at 15 (majority opinion). 
 168. See Oleszko v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998); Jane Student 1 v. 
Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala. 2002); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 
82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000); EEOC v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan 
Sisters, No. 96-C-1428, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 1997); Greet 
v. Zagrocki, No. CIV. A. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996). 
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counselors.169  The case involved a suit brought by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of a 
woman who claimed that she was discriminated against because of 
her race.170  The defendant employer sought discovery of the 
marriage counseling records of the woman and her husband to 
counter any claims that the woman’s discharge was to blame for her 
marital problems.171  The court, with no discussion, declared that 
the marriage counseling records of the couple fell under the 
umbrella of the privilege created in Jaffee.172 
b. Employee Assistance Programs 
As a result of the Jaffee decision, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1996 vacated an order that had 
forced disclosure of an Employee Assistance Program’s (EAP) files 
pertaining to a police officer whose department was being sued 
because of the officer’s actions.173  The court, and not the police 
officer (who was not represented at the hearing), asserted the 
privilege and categorized it as a psychotherapist privilege on its 
own.174  The party opposing the motion to compel did not specify 
which privilege was the basis for its objection.175  The court focused 
on the sensitive nature of the counseling provided by the EAP and, 
with barely any discussion, lumped the EAP in with the 
psychotherapist privilege.176 
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Oleszko 
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund177 further elaborated upon the 
extension of the privilege to EAPs.178  Specifically, the court 
answered the question of whether or not the privilege extends to 
unlicensed counselors of an EAP.179  In deciding this question, the 
court looked to Jaffee for guidance.180 
 
 169. See St. Michael Hosp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847, at *7. 
 170. Id. at *1. 
 171. Id. at *7. 
 172. Id.  Although the court found that the records could be protected under 
the psychotherapist privilege, the privilege would have to be waived if the EEOC 
were to seek damages for harm to the woman’s marriage.  Id. 
 173. Greet, 1996 WL 724933, at *1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. 243 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 178. See id. at 1157–59. 
 179. Id. at 1157. 
 180. Id. at 1156–57. 
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EAPs, in the court’s ruling, served the same public and private 
interests as social workers and therefore, using the same rationale, 
should be encompassed in the privilege.181  In particular, the court 
focused upon the “gateway” role that EAPs play in the treatment of 
mental health issues.182  To allow the documents and personnel of 
an EAP to be used in a courtroom would be to permit an end run 
around the privilege whenever an individual begins treatment with 
an EAP instead of directly with a psychotherapist.183 
In allowing the protection by privilege of communications with 
unlicensed employees of EAPs, the court distinguished the 
historical background of EAPs from the social workers involved in 
Jaffee.184  EAPs were a rapidly growing area of the mental health 
field and as such were only beginning to be licensed by the states.185  
The court declined to penalize the clients of EAPs simply because 
EAPs are relative newcomers in the mental health field.186 
c. Licensed vs. Unlicensed Counselors 
The Oleszko court’s discussion of licensed versus unlicensed 
counselors in the EAP setting was not the only court opinion to 
weigh in on the issue of licenses and their impact on the existence 
of a privilege.187  In United States v. Lowe,188 the court ruled that 
communications with a rape counselor had some form of federal 
privilege in light of the Jaffee ruling.189  But the Lowe court did not 
explore the parameters of such a privilege because it was 
unnecessary in the case before it.190 
The Speaker v. County of San Bernardino191 case in 2000 provided 
an additional wrinkle to the licensure debate.192  In the case, a 
licensed marriage, family, and child counselor (MFCC) met with a 
 
 181. Id. at 1157–58. 
 182. Id. at 1159. 
 183. Id. at 1158. 
 184. Id. at 1158 n.5. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1158. 
 187. See Jane Student 1 v. Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306, 309–10 (S.D. Ala. 2002); 
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 188. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97. 
 189. Id. at 99.   
 190. Id. at 100 (holding that whatever privilege existed was limitedly waived by 
the client for in camera review by the court). 
   191. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 192. Id. 
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San Bernardino police officer following a shooting incident.193  The 
department arranged the sessions for the officer as part of its 
mandatory follow-up to a shooting incident.194  The department 
told the officer that the sessions were confidential.195 
The court began by ruling that because the type of counseling 
performed was outside the scope of the license of the counselor, 
the communications were not covered by the Jaffee privilege.196  
Instead of focusing on this aspect of the case, the court turned to 
the understanding of the officer, who believed that the 
communications in question were confidential.197  The court ruled 
that the officer’s communications with the counselor were 
privileged because the officer reasonably believed that he was 
speaking to a licensed psychotherapist.198  To support its ruling, the 
court looked to similar situations dealing with the attorney-client 
privilege, both in courts and in scholarly literature.199 
Courts have not always been so lenient in applying the 
psychotherapist privilege to unlicensed counselors.200  None of the 
courts previously mentioned in this section made reference to the 
oft quoted, “these exceptions to the demand for every man’s 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they 
are in derogation of the search for truth.”201  In Jane Student 1 v. 
Williams,202 the court acknowledged this as a “bedrock principle of 
American jurisprudence.”203  It was through this lens, rather than 
the more permissive perspectives of previous courts, that the Jane 
Student 1 court rejected the application of the privilege to 
communications with an unlicensed counselor.204 
Another rejected extension of the psychotherapist privilege 
involved volunteers from Alcoholics Anonymous.205  A criminal 
 
 193. Id. at 1107. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1110–11. 
 197. Id. at 1112. 
 198. Id. at 1114. 
 199. Id. at 1112–13. 
 200. See United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the defendant’s statements to volunteers working at the office of an 
association for alcoholics were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege). 
 201. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 202. 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala. 2002). 
 203. Id. at 309. 
 204. Id. at 310. 
 205. See Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 657. 
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defendant sought to exclude testimony from the volunteers on the 
grounds that the communications were protected under the 
privilege.206  The court rejected that argument based on numerous 
considerations.207  The volunteers had no professional 
qualifications, did not behave in such a manner that they could be 
confused with a psychotherapist, did not work in an office that 
suggested that they provided mental health services, and did not 
speak with the defendant “for the purposes of diagnosis or 
treatment.”208  Taken as a whole, the unlicensed volunteers in this 
situation did not qualify under any expansive definition of 
psychotherapists.209 
2. Exceptions 
In addition to further clarifying who is eligible for protection 
under the federal psychotherapist privilege, the courts have also 
imported exceptions to the privilege from other, more established 
privileges such as the attorney-client privilege.  The crime-fraud 
exception has been applied to the psychotherapist privilege in at 
least one circuit.  Despite a near endorsement by the Supreme 
Court in Jaffee, there is a split among the federal circuits regarding 
the application of a dangerous patient exception. 
a. Crime-Fraud Exception 
Although the Jaffee court did not envision a qualified privilege, 
it did endorse the idea that exceptions to the privilege might be 
necessary.210  In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
borrowed the crime-fraud exception from the attorney-client 
privilege and applied it to the psychotherapist privilege.211  The 
exception applied “[o]nly when communications are intended 
directly to advance a particular criminal or fraudulent endeavor      
. . . .”212  In order to invoke the privilege, the party seeking its use 
 
 206. Id. at 656. 
 207. Id. at 656–57. 
 208. Id. at 657. 
 209. Id. at 656–57. 
 210. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996). 
 211. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 
1999).  The case involved a grand jury investigation into multiple crimes including 
bank fraud.  Violette spoke with two psychotherapists “as part of a scheme to 
defraud lenders and/or disability insurers.”  Id. at 78. 
 212. Id. at 77. 
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was required to make a prima facie showing that the exception 
should be applied.213 
b. Dangerous Patient Exception 
In a footnote, the Jaffee court also seemed to open the door for 
a dangerous patient exception, but there is a split in the circuits as 
to its existence.214  In United States v. Glass,215 the Tenth Circuit 
created a dangerous patient exception when it ruled that an 
evidentiary hearing would be required to evaluate the seriousness 
of the threat and the necessity of the disclosure to avoid the 
harm.216 
Other courts have not followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead.217  In 
United States v. Hayes,218 the Sixth Circuit stated that, although 
psychotherapists may disclose the existence of threats to third 
parties and testify at involuntary hospitalization proceedings, they 
did not have a duty to testify at either criminal or civil 
proceedings.219  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected a dangerous 
patient exception in United States v. Chase220 in 2003.221 
 
 213. Id. at 78. 
 214. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.  Footnote nineteen reads: 
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future 
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt 
that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for 
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be 
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.  
Id. 
 215. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 216. Id. at 1357.  In the Glass case, Glass voluntarily sought mental health 
treatment from a psychotherapist.  Id.  During the treatment, Glass expressed a 
desire to shoot President Clinton and Hilary Clinton.  Id.  Glass was released from 
the facility upon the promise to continue outpatient treatment while living with 
his father.  Id.  When Glass moved out of his father’s home ten days after being 
released, the doctor contacted local authorities who in turn contacted the Secret 
Service.  Id.  Glass was indicted for threatening the President, and the doctor’s 
testimony was sought in connection with proving the threat. Id. 
 217. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 218. 227 F.3d 578. 
 219. Id. at 586.  In Hayes, the government sought the testimony of a treating 
psychotherapist who had heard threats toward a federal official in the course of 
the treatment of Hayes.  Id. at 583.  The government, after the psychotherapist 
had disclosed the threat to a person at risk, brought charges against Hayes for 
threatening a federal official.  Id. at 580–81. 
 220. 340 F.3d 978. 
 221. Id. at 992.  In Chase, the defendant was treated by a psychiatrist for a 
variety of mental health ailments.  Id. at 979.  In the course of treatment, the 
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3. Other Privileges 
The federal district courts have also not been shy in utilizing 
FRE 501 and the Jaffee framework to create new privileges.  With 
the purpose of facilitating fair resolutions to conflicts between 
opposing parties, courts have recognized the need to create both a 
mediation privilege and a settlement privilege.  These new 
privileges were more rooted in public policy than in the consensus 
among states as to their existence. 
a. Mediation Privilege 
In Folb v. Motion Picture Industries Pension and Health Plans,222 a 
federal district court created a federal mediation privilege using 
the Jaffee framework.223  Like the Jaffee Court, the Folb court started 
from the basic tenet that privileges should not be lightly created.224  
The Folb court utilized the Jaffee test to evaluate the legitimacy of a 
federal mediation privilege.225  After applying the test to the facts of 
the case, the court ruled that a federal mediation privilege did 
exist.226 
The court followed the lead of Jaffee in creating the scope of 
the privilege, as well.227  The court declined to create a limited 
privilege that required a balancing test for application.228  The 
privilege protected communications revealed as part of a formal 
mediation with a neutral mediator.229  This included 
communications with the mediator, whether before or during the 
 
defendant revealed to the psychiatrist a list of people whom the defendant had 
thought about harming that included two FBI agents with whom the defendant 
had dealings.  Id.  After speaking with her supervisor and legal counsel for her 
institution, the psychiatrist contacted the local police, who in turn contacted the 
FBI.  Id. at 980.  The defendant was charged with three counts, including 
threatening to kill the agents.  Id. at 981. 
 222. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 223. Id. at 1170–80. 
 224. Id. at 1171. 
 225. Id.  Under this formulation, the court must ask: 
(1) whether the asserted privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for 
confidence and trust[;]’(2) whether the privilege would serve public 
ends; (3) whether the evidentiary detriment caused by exercise of the 
privilege is modest; and (4) whether denial of the federal privilege would 
frustrate a parallel privilege adopted by the states.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 226. Id. at 1179–80. 
 227. Id. at 1180. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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proceeding, and communications with the other party during the 
mediation.230  It did not include negotiations outside of the 
mediation between the parties.231 
In the 2000 case of Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Commission,232 the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania followed the lead of Folb and recognized a federal 
mediation privilege.233  In defining the scope of the privilege, the 
court first looked to the District’s local rules.234  Communications 
related to a mediation proceeding involving a neutral were 
protected.235  The limitation placed on the privilege by the court 
was that evidence that was independently discoverable would still 
be discoverable even though it was used as part of a mediation 
proceeding.236 
In 2002, a U.S. bankruptcy court provided some specific 
examples of items protected by the mediation privilege as well as 
one significant exception.237  The court protected slides created for 
the mediation proceeding, memoranda of law presented to the 
neutral, as well as other memoranda submitted during the 
proceedings and correspondence between the parties and the 
mediator.238  The court drew the line, however, at materials 
prepared “well in advance of the mediation.”239 
b. Settlement Privilege 
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit recognized a settlement privilege 
under FRE 501 and Jaffee.240  In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles 
Power Supply, Inc.,241 the court sought to answer the question of 
whether a litigant could compel discovery of settlement negotiation 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. 104 F. Supp. 2d 511 (W.D. Penn. 2000). 
 233. Id. at 517. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (citing W. Dist. Local R. 16.3.5(E), 16.3.1). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See In re RDM Sports Group Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2002). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  The court provided no guidance on what “well in advance of the 
mediation” meant.  See id.  The excluded documents, however, were ones that had 
been disclosed to opposing counsel prior to the mediation.  Id. at 422. 
 240. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 
976, 979–81 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 241. Id. 
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communications from another related case involving his or her 
opponent.242  The court used an abbreviated Jaffee analysis in its 
decision that focused on the public interest promoted by the 
privilege and the history in the circuit of confidentiality of 
communications during settlement.243 
The overriding concern of the court was the public policy 
issues that might arise if the privilege was not recognized.244  In 
particular, the court was concerned with the possible impairment 
of settlement negotiations if the communications within them were 
not considered confidential.245  In addition, the court called into 
question the veracity and reliability of statements made during 
settlement discussions.246  The scope of the privilege was simply 
“any communications made in furtherance of settlement.”247 
C. Summary of Analogous Case Law 
The Jaffee court explicitly rejected a qualified privilege for 
psychotherapists that would require a balancing test component in 
order for the privilege to be exercised.248  Instead, the Court crafted 
a privilege that provided a level of certainty in its protection of 
communications made to psychotherapists.249  Although the 
privilege was not absolute in the pure sense of the word, it was 
broad.250  The rule was that “confidential communications between 
a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of 
diagnosis or treatment are protected.”251 
The rule was quickly expanded upon in the Jaffee opinion to 
include licensed social workers.252  Subsequent courts have further 
expanded the protected class covered by the Jaffee rule to include 
marriage counselors, EAPs, unlicensed rape counselors, and 
counselors whom the recipient of the services reasonably believed 
would qualify for the Jaffee privilege.253  Other courts have rejected 
 
 242. Id. at 979. 
 243. Id. at 980–81 
 244. Id. at 980. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 981. 
 247. Id. at 983. 
 248. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). 
 249. Id. at 17–18. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 15. 
 252. Id. at 15–17. 
 253. See Oleszko v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) 
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the application of Jaffee to unlicensed mental health practitioners 
and Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers.254  The scope of what type of 
practitioners communications can be with for purposes of the 
psychotherapist privilege is still an open question that has seen 
some courts be very permissive in interpretation.255 
Lower courts have also developed exceptions to the 
privilege.256  One court has imported the crime-fraud exception 
from the attorney-client privilege, while others have debated the 
existence of a dangerous patient exception despite a near 
endorsement of such an exception by the Supreme Court.257 
Courts have also created new privileges under the Jaffee 
framework, including a federal mediation privilege and a federal 
settlement privilege.258  The mediation privilege protects 
communications related to proceedings before a neutral 
mediator.259  It does not protect subsequent communications nor 
does it protect communications that were prepared too far ahead 
of the time of the proceedings.260  Similarly, the settlement privilege 
protects communications made by parties when trying to resolve 
their dispute.261  The settlement privilege, however, has a less 
formal feel because it does not require a formal proceeding to be 
 
(EAPs); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (person reasonably believes privilege applies); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, No. 96-C-1428997, 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 1997) (marriage counselors); 
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996) (unlicensed rape 
counselors); Greet v. Zagrocki, No. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
16, 1996) (EAPs). 
 254. See United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers); Jane Student 1 v. Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306, 
310 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (unlicensed mental health practitioners). 
 255. See sources cited supra note 253. 
 256. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 
1999); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 257. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (dangerous-
patient); United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000) (dangerous-
patient); Violette, 183 F.3d at 78 (crime-fraud); Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360. 
 258. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 
976, 977 (6th Cir. 2003) (settlement privilege); Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 104 
F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Penn. 2000) (mediation privilege); Folb v. Motion 
Picture Indus. Pension and Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (C.D. Cal. 
1998) (mediation privilege); In re RDM Sports Group Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 430 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (mediation privilege). 
    259.  Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. 
    260.  Id. 
   261.  Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 977. 
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the focal point of the communications.262 
V. FACTORS FAVORING A COMMON-LAW JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
For journalists, Jaffee and its progeny offer hope because of the 
courts’ embrace of state law as a guideline for federal privileges.  
One factor favoring a common-law journalist’s privilege is the fact 
that nearly all of the states have recognized some sort of journalist’s 
privilege by statute or by court ruling.  As noted earlier, thirty-two 
states and the District of Columbia provide statutory or court-rule 
protection to journalists, and most of the other states recognize a 
common-law or constitutional privilege.263  While the degree of 
protection varies considerably, it is safe to say that all of the states 
that recognize some form of journalist’s privilege provide at least 
qualified protection to journalists seeking to protect the identities 
of confidential sources.264 
Federal law is not as helpful to journalists as state law, but the 
federal split on the privilege’s existence, extent, and origin may 
work to journalists’ advantage.  In Jaffee, the Court noted that one 
reason for accepting the case was the fact that the federal appellate 
courts were split on whether such a privilege should be 
recognized.265 
Given the widespread recognition of at least a qualified 
privilege for confidential material among the states and the conflict 
among federal appellate courts, journalists’ case for a common-law 
privilege could be attractive to the Supreme Court under FRE 501 
and Jaffee.  Although lower courts have split in various directions in 
their interpretations of Jaffee, that decision has certainly not 
prevented lower courts from recognizing new privileges or 
extending Jaffee to related professionals. 
As noted earlier, some federal appellate courts already have 
suggested that the common law is a source of protection for 
journalists.266  A more recent federal district court decision, 
although it did not stand up on appeal, still provides fodder for 
arguments in support of a common-law journalist’s privilege. 
 
   262.  Id. 
 263. See supra Part II.A. 
   264.  See id. 
 265. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996). 
 266. See supra Part II.B. 
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A. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales 
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit overturned a Southern District of New York ruling that had 
protected the phone records of a pair of New York Times journalists 
based upon both a constitutional and federal common-law 
journalist’s privilege.267  The Circuit Court’s basis for overruling the 
district court was that whatever privilege may have existed under 
the federal common law was overcome by the factual circumstances 
of the case.268  The Supreme Court declined to stay the Circuit 
Court’s ruling.269 Despite the ruling of the Circuit Court and the 
Supreme Court’s denial of a stay, the district court’s opinion 
provides a good model for lawyers or judges who are seeking the 
recognition of a federal common-law journalist’s privilege, 
particularly because the Second Circuit panel did not rule out the 
existence of a common-law privilege.270 
In this case, the New York Times sought a declaratory judgment 
for protection of the telephone records of two Times reporters from 
subpoena by a federal special prosecutor.271  The special prosecutor 
was seeking the records as part of a grand jury investigation into 
leaks by government officials to the two reporters of upcoming 
raids on two Islamic charities suspected of aiding terrorists.272  The 
Times claimed that both the First Amendment and the federal 
common law protected the conversations of its reporters with 
confidential sources from disclosure to the grand jury.273 
In order to decide whether the First Amendment protected 
the New York Times, the district court looked first to the one 
Supreme Court case on the topic, Branzburg.274  The New York Times 
court noted that this somewhat fractured opinion has resulted in a 
variety of interpretations of the decision by both courts and 
academics.275  Because of this variety of interpretations, the district 
court looked to the jurisprudence of its own circuit for the 
direction it should take in answering the question of whether the 
 
 267. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’g 382       
F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), stay denied, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006). 
 268. N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 170. 
 269. N.Y. Times, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006). 
 270. See N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 163. 
 271. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
 272. Id. at 466–68. 
 273. Id. at 467. 
 274. Id. at 484; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972).   
 275. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 485–86. 
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New York Times and its reporters had a First Amendment claim of 
protection from the grand jury subpoena.276  The district court 
found that in the Second Circuit there is a qualified First 
Amendment journalist’s privilege based upon Branzburg.277 
As its common-law argument, the New York Times advocated the 
creation of a journalist’s privilege under FRE 501 using the test 
fashioned by the Supreme Court in Jaffee.278  The district court 
ruled that there was a qualified federal common-law journalist’s 
privilege under FRE 501 using the Jaffee test.279  What is most 
curious about the holding of the district court regarding the 
federal common-law journalist’s privilege is that the privilege was 
qualified.280  The Jaffee Court created a non-qualified privilege in 
order to provide a level of certainty to those who might need its 
protection.281  The district court chose a more uncertain path by 
recognizing a qualified privilege.  The Second Circuit panel in New 
York Times noted that it agreed with the district court that any 
common-law journalist’s privilege would be qualified.282 
The New York Times district court used the Petroleum Products283 
test to determine if the New York Times was eligible for protection 
under a combined First Amendment and federal common-law 
journalist’s privilege.284  The Petroleum Products test required the 
government to make “a clear and specific showing that the 
information is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to 
the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other 
available sources.”285  This test is part of the line of Second Circuit, 
Branzburg-related cases.286  There is no mention of common-law 
privilege cases and their scope as a potential source in New York 
 
 276. Id. at 486–90. 
 277. Id. at 490. 
 278. Id. at 492.  The Jaffee test, as utilized in New York Times, is comprised of 
three factors: (1) would the privilege serve significant private interests, (2) would 
the privilege serve important public interests, and (3) would the significant private 
and public interests served by a privilege outweigh the evidentiary benefit if no 
privilege existed?  Id. at 497–505.  A fourth variable that could be used to support 
the creation of a privilege is the consensus of the States upon the existence of the 
privilege.  Id. 
 279. Id. at 508. 
 280. Id. at 501. 
 281. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996). 
 282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 283. In re Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 284. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 510. 
 285. Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d at 7. 
 286. See id. at 7–8. 
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Times for defining the journalist’s privilege recognized by the court. 
It is worth noting that there was no unanimity on the Second 
Circuit panel that ultimately reversed the district court.  In dissent, 
Judge Robert Sack wrote that he had “no doubt” that a common-
law journalist’s privilege had developed under FRE 501 since 
Branzburg was decided.287  Judge Sack suggested that a qualified 
journalist’s privilege seemed “easily—even obviously—to meet” the 
Jaffee factors for recognition of a privilege: the serving of private 
and public interests that outweighed the evidentiary benefit of 
rejecting the privilege, and widespread recognition by the states.288 
Other recent decisions also are notable for leaving a door 
open for a common-law privilege.  For example, a federal district 
court in California refused to quash grand jury subpoenas for two 
San Francisco Chronicle reporters who published information from 
secret grand jury transcripts related to an investigation of steroid 
use in baseball.289  The court found that Branzburg required it to 
reject recognition of a common-law privilege in the grand jury 
context,290 but in the next sentence the court also said that even if it 
did recognize a privilege, it would be overcome in this case.291  This 
suggests that the court still felt the need to go through a qualified 
privilege analysis even as it rejected the existence of the privilege in 
the case’s particular fact situation.  In the Judith Miller case,292 the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals judges agreed that 
Miller should be forced to testify to a grand jury investigating the 
public revelation of a CIA agent’s identity.293  The judges, however, 
disagreed on the existence of a privilege.  One judge dismissed the 
existence of a common-law privilege and suggested that the 
creation of such a privilege was a strictly legislative function.294  
Another suggested that a common-law privilege might exist, but it 
was not necessary to determine that to decide this case.295  The 
third would recognize a common-law privilege that would require a 
showing of need, exhaustion of alternative sources, and a balancing 
of the public interest in disclosing the journalist’s source versus the 
 
 287. N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 181 (Sack, J., dissenting). 
 288. Id. 
 289. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 290. Id. at 1119. 
 291. Id. 
 292. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 293. Id. at 968. 
 294. Id. at 981 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
 295. Id. at 984 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
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public interest in the reporter exposing the information to the 
public.296 
If a court recognized that there was a common-law journalist’s 
privilege, but not a First Amendment based privilege, where should 
the court look for guidance in defining the scope of the common-
law privilege?  In the era following the Jaffee decision, could Jaffee 
and its progeny provide some guidance to the courts in defining 
the scope of a common-law journalist’s privilege? 
B. Application of Analogous Case Law to a Journalist’s Privilege 
Reporters in cases such as Branzburg and New York Times have 
sought protection from revealing their sources for news stories to 
grand juries, be it directly or through related information.  The 
communication itself is not confidential, since the reporter 
typically publishes it.  The identity of the source, however, is the 
real confidential communication.  This is different than the 
psychotherapist, mediation, or settlement communication where 
the identities of the parties are known, but the statements made 
and documents used are held in confidence and protected by 
privilege under FRE 501.  If a lawyer wished to argue for a FRE 501 
journalist’s privilege independent of Branzburg, however, Jaffee and 
its progeny would provide analogous case law for helping shape the 
scope of the privilege. 
In following Jaffee, the communications between the reporter 
and the source must be confidential.  The communication must be 
in the course of the private and public justifications for allowing 
the privilege—in the case of reporters, the collection of 
information in order to distribute it for public consumption. 
The most problematic aspect of the application of a 
journalist’s privilege would be determining who qualifies for the 
privilege.  The psychotherapist privilege has resulted in numerous 
cases and divisions in circuits as to who is covered, and the 
psychotherapist privilege does not have the same type of First 
Amendment concerns that creating a protected class for journalists 
would have.297  If a court were to utilize a Jaffee-style analysis of the 
scope of a journalist’s privilege, the precedent would imply that the 
 
 296. Id. at 997–98 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 297. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704–05 (1972) (suggesting that 
recognition of a journalist’s privilege would actually create a First Amendment 
conflict because courts would have to limit its reach to some speakers and not 
others). 
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court should evaluate the application of the privilege on a case-by-
case basis, just as the Supreme Court did in Jaffee and lower courts 
have done in subsequent cases.  Post-Branzburg case law, however, 
would be useful here.  Circuit courts have developed a test for 
determining who may claim protection of a journalist’s privilege by 
looking at the intent of the potential witness at the time the 
information being sought was gathered.  In general, the circuits 
that have confronted the issue have determined that a “journalist” 
is someone engaged in investigative reporting who had the intent, 
at the time the disputed information was gathered, of 
disseminating it to the public.298 
The importation of the crime-fraud exception and the 
dangerous patient exception into a journalist’s privilege would be 
realistic possibilities.  These exceptions did not originate as part of 
the psychotherapist privilege but instead were borrowed from 
other, already existing privileges.  The justifications for having 
these exceptions most likely would carry over into a FRE 501 
journalist’s privilege.  A court could also decide to do as the Jaffee 
Court did and leave the creation of exceptions to the lower courts 
in subsequent cases. 
The mediation and settlement privileges could provide a 
backdrop for an expansive perception of a journalist’s privilege.  
Both privileges protect communications and documents that were 
part of the protected proceedings and negotiations.  It could 
therefore be argued that any communications and documents 
related to the confidential source could be protected so long as it is 
not done too far ahead of time. 
While the Jaffee and the New York Times rulings both provide 
some hope to journalists in regard to the creation of a federal 
common-law privilege, other factors weigh against a common-law 
privilege, as the next section will discuss. 
 
 298. See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim of talk-
show host that he could seek protection under journalist’s privilege); Shoen v. 
Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that nonfiction book author qualified 
for protection under journalist’s privilege); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 
(2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim of book author for privilege protection because 
information was not gathered for purpose of dissemination but for personal 
reasons). 
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VI. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST A COMMON-LAW JOURNALIST’S 
PRIVILEGE 
If the Jaffee ruling gives hope to journalists that the Supreme 
Court would rule in their favor based on state support for the 
privilege and a desire to resolve a circuit split, it also creates 
obstacles. 
The Court noted in Jaffee that its decision to uphold the 
psychotherapist privilege was reinforced by the fact that the 
committee whose recommendations led to FRE 501 originally had 
proposed that the psychotherapist privilege be among nine specific 
privileges recognized in federal law.299 As a recent commentator 
noted, a journalist’s privilege was not among the nine specific 
privileges recommended before FRE 501 was adopted.300  For that 
reason, the commentator said that FRE 501 would have to be 
amended to include a journalist’s privilege, because no such 
common-law privilege could be recognized by a federal court 
under the existing rule.301  But the district court in New York Times 
did not see the non-inclusion of the journalist’s privilege in the 
original draft of FRE 501 as a bar to the recognition of such a 
privilege.302 
While it may not be necessary to amend FRE 501 to gain 
recognition of a journalist’s privilege, there are other significant 
hurdles for journalists.  For one thing, it is not clear that the Jaffee 
opinion is more than an aberration from the Court’s general policy 
on privileges.  One commentator has called the Court’s “strong 
assertion” of the privilege “peculiar,”303 while another has said the 
Court “merely paid lip-service” to common-law principles in its 
decision.304  Another critic was milder, calling the decision 
“questionable,” but also finding one part of the decision potentially 
dangerous.305  This was the part of the Court’s analysis that also 
 
 299. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1996). 
 300. Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and 
Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 492 (2002). 
 301. Id. at 447–48, 500. 
 302. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 303. Molly Rebecca Bryson, Note, Protecting Confidential Communications Between 
a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 998–99 
(1997). 
 304. Svetanics, supra note 131, at 753. 
 305. Rule 501—Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 110 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287 
(1996). 
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caused the greatest consternation for Justice Scalia in his dissent in 
Jaffee but would be very helpful for the press: the reliance on state 
action.  Justice Scalia’s dissent attacked the majority for recognizing 
a new federal privilege that was created not by state common law 
but, in most states, by statute.306  Justice Scalia argued that the fact 
that the states had enacted a psychotherapist privilege by statute 
indicated that the matter did not “lend itself to judicial treatment” 
but to the flexibility of legislation.307  It should be noted that among 
all of the states that recognize some form of journalist’s privilege, 
thirty-two (plus the District of Columbia) do so through statutes or 
a formal court rule.308 
Even assuming that Justice Scalia’s dissent, which was joined by 
only one other justice, would carry little weight in another privilege 
case, the fact remains that showing that nearly all of the states 
recognize a privilege would solve only half of a journalist’s 
problem.  Widespread state support for the privilege might indicate 
that “experience” is on journalists’ side (coupled with uneven 
support for a privilege in the federal appellate courts).  But what 
about “reason”? 
A major blow to journalists’ cause before the Supreme Court 
likely would come from an analysis of reason.  For starters, the 
Court has consistently said that the press clause of the First 
Amendment confers no special privileges on the institutional 
media.309  This line of precedent would make it exceedingly 
difficult to persuade the Court to find a constitutional or common-
law basis for a journalist’s privilege. 
As noted earlier, one factor that could weigh against Supreme 
Court recognition of a common-law journalist’s privilege is the fact 
that the committee that recommended nine specific privileges for 
recognition prior to the adoption of Rule 501 did not include a 
 
 306. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 307. Id. at 26. 
 308. See supra notes 55–56. 
 309. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (finding 
that First Amendment does not immunize press from lawsuits under doctrine of 
promissory estoppel for breaking promise of confidentiality to source); Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1979) (finding that First Amendment does not 
prevent libel plaintiff from inquiring into editorial process in order to show actual 
malice); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (finding that press has no 
extraordinary rights to photograph or tape conditions inside county jail); Saxbe v. 
Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974) (finding press has no extraordinary rights to 
demand that it be allowed to interview specific prisoners in federal penal facility); 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same, with regard to state prisons). 
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journalist’s privilege on the list.310  While this in itself may not be 
fatal to journalists’ hopes, it should be noted that the Court in Jaffee 
did rely in part on the fact that a psychotherapist privilege was on 
the list to reinforce its recognition of the privilege in that case.311  
The list also did not include a privilege for social workers, but it 
would be easier for the Court to extend a psychotherapist privilege 
to social workers performing similar tasks than it would be for the 
Court to recognize a journalist’s privilege that has no similar tie to 
an existing privilege. 
The largest obstacle for journalists, however, comes from a 
major difference between journalists and the Jaffee 
psychotherapists.  In Jaffee, the Court was dealing with professionals 
who are licensed by states to provide specific services.  Journalists 
are not licensed, and there is no clear definition of who may claim 
the title “journalist.”  In fact, the Supreme Court in Branzburg 
suggested that even attempting to define a class of persons who 
could claim protection under a judicially recognized journalist’s 
privilege would raise First Amendment concerns.312  The Court’s 
majority opinion said that defining a class of privileged “journalists” 
would lead to severe problems for the courts in trying to distinguish 
between members of the institutional press and authors, lecturers, 
and educators who perform a similar function of informing the 
public on important issues.313  Any attempt to persuade the Court 
to recognize a common-law privilege would inevitably lead to a 
similar problem of defining to whom it applied. 
In short, there are factors in privilege law that weigh both for 
and against Supreme Court recognition of a common-law 
journalist’s privilege.  Where does that leave journalists and those 
who support their desire for a privilege so they can protect sensitive 
sources while avoiding legal sanctions? 
VII.   ANALYSIS: COMMON LAW OR SHIELD LAW? 
The two years leading up to the writing of this article have not 
been good times for journalists seeking to avoid identifying 
confidential sources.  In December 2004, a Rhode Island television 
reporter, James Taricani, was sentenced to six months of house 
 
 310. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704–05 (1972). 
 313. Id. 
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arrest for criminal contempt after defying a judge’s order to reveal 
his source.314  Taricani had obtained from the source an FBI tape 
showing a Providence, Rhode Island, city official apparently taking 
a bribe from an informant.315  The tape was evidence in a pending 
criminal trial and was covered by a gag order issued by the 
presiding judge.316  Taricani was released early from his sentence 
for good behavior.317  Taricani’s source revealed himself before the 
reporter was sentenced and later was convicted of criminal 
contempt, disbarred, and ordered to serve up to eighteen months 
in prison.318 
In July 2005, Judith Miller of the New York Times entered a 
federal prison in Virginia to serve a sentence for civil contempt.319  
A federal grand jury subpoenaed Miller to learn the identity of a 
source or sources within the Bush administration who might have 
identified an undercover CIA operative to reporters.320  The 
operative, Valerie Plame Wilson, is married to Joseph Wilson IV, a 
former ambassador who has criticized the Bush administration’s 
efforts to justify going to war with Iraq.321  Wilson wrote an opinion 
piece for the Times in 2003 claiming that he had disproved a rumor 
about Saddam Hussein’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons that 
the administration had relied upon to justify war.322  Shortly after 
his article appeared, columnist Robert Novak reported that 
Wilson’s wife, a CIA operative identified to him by two 
administration officials, had recommended Wilson for the CIA-
sponsored mission to investigate the rumor.323  The motive for the 
leak is not entirely clear.  Either the administration was attempting 
to discredit Wilson by suggesting that his investigation was really a 
 
 314. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 27, In re Special Proceeding, No.     
01-47 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/opinions/ 
torres/12092004_1-01msc0047t_sentencing.pdf. 
 315. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47, 32 Media L. Rep. 1075 
(D.R.I. 2003). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Pam Belluck, Reporter Granted Release from Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 
2005, at A21. 
 318. Mike Stanton & W. Zachary Malinowski, Bevilacqua Gets 18 Months for 
Leaking Tape, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 319. See Liptak, supra note 15. 
 320. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 321. See id. at 966. 
 322. Joseph C. Wilson, IV, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, 
§ 4 (Magazine), at 9. 
 323. Robert Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A21. 
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junket arranged by his wife, or it was trying to get back at Wilson by 
damaging his wife’s career.324  What is clear is that it is illegal, under 
certain circumstances, to reveal the identity of an undercover CIA 
operative to people not authorized to possess such information.325 
Several reporters who were known to have received the same 
information that Novak received eventually testified to the grand 
jury investigating whether the leak violated federal law.326  Miller, 
however, refused to testify until she was sure her source had 
released her from her promise of confidentiality and until she 
received assurances from Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald that 
he would not ask her about other sources.327  Miller left jail in late 
September 2005 after eighty-five days and testified to the grand jury 
after both conditions were met.328  A month later, the grand jury 
indicted I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s 
chief of staff and Miller’s source, on charges that he lied to the 
grand jury and investigators about his part in “outing” Mrs. 
Wilson.329  His trial began in late January 2007 with a number of 
reporters on the witness list.330 
Neither Taricani’s nor Miller’s case would have been good 
candidates for getting the Supreme Court to consider recognizing 
a federal common-law journalist’s privilege.  As the First Circuit 
noted in rejecting Taricani’s appeal of his contempt holding,331 a 
special prosecutor investigating a possible crime (criminal 
contempt, in this case) is very much like a grand jury, so Branzburg 
was directly on point in rejecting the existence of a privilege.332  
Miller’s case was even more on point in comparison to Branzburg 
because she was defying a grand jury subpoena in regard to an 
investigation of specific criminal activity, as the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted.333 
 
 324. See Scott Shane, Private Spy and Public Spouse Live at Center of Leak Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 2005, at A1. 
 325. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000). 
 326. See Liptak, supra note 15, at A1; Susan Schmidt, Post Source Reveals Identity 
to Leak Probers, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2004, at A2; Jacques Steinberg, Threat of 
Jailing Is Lifted with Reporter’s Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A16. 
 327. Johnston & Jehl, supra note 15, at A1. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Johnston & Stevenson, supra note 15, at A1. 
 330. Neil A. Lewis, Libby Trial to Display Changed Reporter-Source Relations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at A16. 
 331. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 332. Id. at 44–45. 
 333. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 
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A more promising case for a consideration of whether a 
common-law privilege exists might have been in the Wen Ho Lee 
Case.  Six reporters from various news organizations were held in 
contempt of court by district judges for refusing to give depositions 
naming confidential sources to Dr. Lee.  Five of the reporters failed 
to comply with an order to give depositions regarding their 
confidential government sources for stories linking Dr. Lee to 
espionage and were ordered to pay $500 a day until they 
complied.334  The judge, however, stayed imposition of the fines 
until the reporters had a chance to appeal.335  In June 2005, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the 
appeals of four of the five reporters: Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles 
Times, H. Josef Hebert of the Associated Press, James Risen of the 
New York Times, and Pierre Thomas of ABC, formerly of CNN.336  
The appellate panel determined that Lee had exhausted 
reasonable alternative sources when he deposed twenty people 
working for the Energy Department, Justice Department, and 
FBI.337  The appellate court, however, said the district court had 
insufficient evidence to find one of the five reporters, Jeff Gerth of 
the New York Times, in contempt because he apparently had no 
information that would be helpful to Lee.338  In November 2005 the 
full appellate court declined to rehear the case en banc on a 4–4 
vote, with two judges not participating.339 
The sixth reporter, Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, who 
was subpoenaed later than the other reporters and also refused to 
answer deposition questions, was found in civil contempt of court 
in November 2005.340  In an unusual twist, Judge Rosemary M. 
Collyer ordered Pincus to contact all of his confidential sources for 
the Lee stories and inform them of her decision so that they could 
have the opportunity to release him from his pledges of 
confidentiality.341  Pincus responded by asking the judge to 
 
2005).  Specifically, the court explained that “there is no material factual 
distinction between the petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the 
appeals before us today.”  Id. 
  334.  Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 347 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 335.  Id. at 33. 
   336.  Wen Ho Lee. v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir 2005). 
   337.  Id. at 60. 
   338.  Id. at 64. 
   339.  Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 340. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 341. Id. at 144. 
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reconsider her order.342 
The Wen Ho Lee case involved a civil action, which does not 
raise the type of constitutional or public policy issues that 
subpoenas related to criminal trials or grand juries raise.343  Also, 
unlike the Taricani case, which involved a leak of evidence in a 
pending criminal case, and the Miller case, which involved a leak 
that could have been a federal crime in itself, the Wen Ho Lee case 
involved reporting about matters of more serious public concern, 
including possible espionage.  Judge David Tatel of the D.C. 
Circuit, dissenting from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc, 
said it was “hard to imagine” how Dr. Lee’s private interest in 
pursuing litigation “could outweigh the public’s interest in 
protecting journalists’ ability to report without reservation on 
sensitive issues of national security.”344 
The Wen Ho Lee case also would have posed problems for 
journalists asserting a common-law privilege.  Judge Collyer’s 
decision with regard to Walter Pincus, issued two weeks after the 
D.C. Circuit’s denial of rehearing in regard to the other reporters, 
specifically rejected the existence of a common-law privilege 
distinct from any First Amendment privilege that might exist in the 
circuit.345  Judge Collyer noted that Judge Tatel had proposed a 
three-part balancing test when reporters were subpoenaed.346  The 
test would require the party issuing the subpoena to prove 
relevance of the material sought, exhaustion of other sources for 
the information, and that the public interest in protecting the 
source was outweighed by the interest in disclosing the 
information.347  Judge Collyer suggested that the first two prongs of 
the test—relevance and exhaustion—were the same as the First 
Amendment test already used in the circuit.348  The third prong, 
the weighing of interests, would raise “very troubling” issues 
 
 342. Charles Lane, Post Reporter Asks Judge to Rethink Order, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 
2005, at A2. 
 343. For a discussion of the journalist’s privilege with regard to criminal 
proceedings, see Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An 
Analysis of United States Court of Appeals Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1441 (2002). 
 344. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d at 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting). 
   345.  Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 138–39 (D.D.C 
2005).  
   346.  Id. 
 347. Id. 
   348.  Id. 
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because it would require judges to determine newsworthiness, she 
wrote.349 
Judge Collyer also argued that Jaffee would not favor a ruling 
for Pincus on the question of whether a common-law journalist’s 
privilege existed.  The judge noted that the Supreme Court in Jaffee 
found that the confidential relationship between psychotherapists 
and patients was central to encouraging the frankness that went to 
the heart of successful therapy and therefore served a “public good 
of transcendent importance.”350  The judge said keeping a source’s 
identity confidential was only a useful tool for a journalist, not a 
right of “transcendent importance.”  She found, therefore, that 
Jaffee was not analogous to Pincus’s situation.351 
Finally—and, perhaps, predictably—Judge Collyer found that 
recognizing a common-law privilege would require a court to 
determine who could claim protection under the privilege.  “The 
proliferation of communications media in the modern world 
makes it impossible” to define “reporter,” she wrote.352  Reporters, 
she noted, do not have special courses of study, are not licensed, 
and are not subject to organized oversight or discipline.353  They are 
not, in other words, anything like the psychotherapists in Jaffee.354 
Judge Collyer conceded that she might be putting the “horse 
behind the cart” in her concern for the definitional problems that 
recognizing a common-law privilege might entail, given that Pincus 
clearly would fit any definition of “reporter.”355  She added, 
however, that answering the question of whether a privilege should 
be recognized would necessarily involve answering the question of 
whom it would protect.356  The two questions “are two sides of the 
same coin: the first cannot be answered without attention to the 
second.”357 
Judge Collyer’s concern is reasonable, and it is not the only 
one that would have made the Wen Ho Lee case problematic for 
journalists if they had succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari and consider recognizing a common-law 
 
 349. Id. at 139. 
 350. Id. at 140 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996)). 
 351. Id. at 141. 
 352. Id. at 140. 
   353.  Id. 
 354. Id. 
   355.  Id. at 140 n.23. 
   356.  Id. 
 357. Id. 
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journalist’s privilege.  As the 4–4 vote on rehearing the first Wen Ho 
Lee subpoena case demonstrates, the D.C. Circuit is divided on 
whether any such privilege already exists.  This division was also 
evident in the three-judge panel’s decision in the same circuit to 
reject Judith Miller’s appeal.358  Although all three judges agreed 
that the government had overcome any journalist’s privilege that 
might exist, all three wrote separate concurring opinions to point 
out their differences with each other.  One judge argued that 
Branzburg359 not only rejected a constitutional privilege but a 
common-law privilege as well.360  Judge Tatel disagreed that 
Branzburg foreclosed any common-law privilege and suggested that 
the fact that most states had adopted a privilege argued in favor of 
common-law recognition.361  The third judge believed that there 
might be a common-law privilege, but also believed that it was 
unwise to explore the issue when it was unnecessary to decide the 
case at hand.362 
Given the wide variation in opinion among judges on the 
District of Columbia appellate and district courts, both Lee and the 
subpoenaed reporters could have found ample ammunition for 
their sides had the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Different 
problems would have arisen if the Court had taken the Miller case 
or New York Times Co. v. Gonzales363 or if it agrees to take one of the 
more recent cases.  Miller’s case, the New York Times case, the 
BALCO grand jury case,364 and a case involving a freelance video 
journalist365 all involve grand jury investigations.  Recognizing a 
constitutional or common-law privilege in any of these cases would 
require the Supreme Court to overturn its own precedent in 
Branzburg.  Although journalists have tried in the last few years to 
argue that Branzburg did not foreclose the recognition of a 
journalist’s privilege in all grand jury subpoena cases, judges have 
by and large disagreed.  For example, two reporters who fought 
subpoenas in the Valerie Plame Wilson investigation lost in their 
attempt to quash the subpoenas when they could not overcome 
 
 358. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 359. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 360. Id. at 977 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
 361. Id. at 986–87 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 362. Id. at 981–86 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 363. 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006), stay denied, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006) 
 364. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 365. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, No. 06-16403, 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 23315 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). 
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what the judge called the “inevitable holding” in Branzburg that 
reporters could not escape grand jury subpoenas without a showing 
of bad faith or harassment.366  Other courts examining the 
precedent in grand jury subpoena cases recently likewise have 
found that Branzburg created an “inevitable” situation for the 
reporters seeking to quash subpoenas.367 
Let us suppose for a moment that the Supreme Court did 
agree to hear a journalist’s privilege case, either an appeal from 
one of the current cases or an appeal in a case that has not yet 
come to light.  Suppose also that the Court did not feel, in the light 
of FRE 501’s passage after the Branzburg decision, that it was 
necessarily bound by Branzburg’s “inevitable holding.”  What would 
most likely happen? 
If the Court conducted a Jaffee-like inquiry, journalists likely 
would argue that there are strong public policy arguments favoring 
the privilege.  They would not have to look far to find such 
arguments.  In his Branzburg dissent, Justice Stewart laid out a 
strong argument favoring a privilege when he noted that reporters 
often needed to use confidential sources to gather news and 
facilitate the free flow of information to the public.368  Similarly, the 
Washington Supreme Court examined the factors favoring a 
common-law privilege and determined that it was essential in a 
complex day and age in which people relied on the press to inform 
them about important matters of public concern.369  The journalists 
also would note that the journalist’s privilege, like the 
psychotherapist privilege at issue in Jaffee, has been recognized by 
most states either through statute, constitutional interpretation, or 
common-law interpretation.370 
The party or parties seeking to compel journalists’ testimony 
(for this hypothetical, let us assume it is the government) likely 
 
 366. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004).  
The reporters, Tim Russert of NBC and Matthew Cooper of Time magazine, later 
testified to the grand jury after their sources released them from their promises of 
confidentiality.  See Steinberg, supra note 326, at A2.  Cooper, however, was later 
subpoenaed again and was expected to go to jail on the same day as Miller until 
his second source released him from a confidentiality promise on the day Miller 
was sentenced.  See Liptak, supra note 15, at A1. 
 367. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23315, at *4. 
 368. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 369. See supra text accompanying notes 71–79. 
 370. See supra text accompanying notes 55–81. 
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would argue, along the lines of Judge Collyer in the Pincus case,371 
that the privilege is a “useful tool” but not a necessity for 
journalists.  The government would rely heavily on Branzburg and 
the concerns expressed there about burdens on lower courts and 
favoring journalists in a way that other citizens are not favored.372  
Depending upon the facts of the case, the government might be 
able to make a compelling argument that the public interest would 
be better served by forcing the journalists to reveal their sources, 
particularly if a national security issue were involved.  At the least, 
the government would note language in Branzburg suggesting that 
the public’s need for “every person’s evidence” is a strong 
counterpoint to any journalist’s argument that she should be 
excused from testifying before a grand jury.373  The government 
likely would note that a journalist’s privilege was not among the 
privileges listed by the committee whose work led to the creation of 
FRE 501.374  The government also would invite the Court to 
consider Justice Scalia’s argument in his Jaffee dissent that state 
statutory creation of privileges was a strong rationale for a federal 
statute, but not a common-law privilege created by judges.375 
How the Court would decide is anyone’s guess.  The facts of 
the particular case before it would be heavy factors in determining 
the outcome.  In a best-case scenario for journalists, the Court 
might declare that FRE 501’s adoption had changed the privilege 
landscape since Branzburg and find that a journalist’s privilege 
existed in federal common law.  The Court would be unlikely to go 
as far as it did in Jaffee and create an almost unqualified privilege, 
however, given that none of the federal circuits nor most of the 
states have adopted absolute privileges.376  The Court likely would 
borrow the language from Justice Stewart’s Branzburg dissent and 
require a showing, before a journalist could be compelled to reveal 
a source, that the information is critical to the underlying case, 
relevant to the case, and unavailable elsewhere.377  Although the 
 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 350–351. 
 372. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33. 
 373. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 374. See supra text accompanying note 300. 
 375. See supra text accompanying notes 306–307. 
 376. Among states with statutory privileges, for example, only a handful fail to 
qualify the privilege in some way in statutory language, and, even in those states, 
courts often have added qualifiers in specific circumstances.  For a more detailed 
discussion, see Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential 
Information in States With Shield Laws, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 325, 342–49 (1999). 
 377. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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Court was reluctant to add exceptions to the privilege it recognized 
in Jaffee, the Court in our hypothetical might add exceptions for 
cases in which the journalist’s testimony was critical to a matter of 
national security or cases in which the journalist witnessed the 
commission of a crime by the source.  The Court might also accept 
Judge Tatel’s invitation to add a fourth prong to the Stewart test 
and require that journalists show in individual cases that the 
privilege would serve some sort of public interest outweighing the 
public interest in revealing the source’s identity.378 
Of course, the worst-case scenario is that the Court would 
refuse to recognize a privilege and would clarify its Branzburg 
holding to find that neither the First Amendment nor the common 
law supported such a privilege.  This would be troublesome 
because it likely would lead the federal appellate circuits that have 
recognized a qualified privilege to reverse themselves in future 
cases and deny the privilege.  Much would depend upon whether 
the Court limited its holding to grand juries or determined that no 
privilege existed in any federal proceeding. 
Ultimately, the success or failure of journalists’ attempts to get 
a common-law privilege recognized by the Supreme Court would 
come down to persuading the Court to abandon its trepidation 
about identifying a class of persons called “journalists.”  It would be 
nearly impossible for the Court to ignore an argument similar to 
Judge Collyer’s that the “proliferation of communications media in 
the modern world” would make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
define such a class of persons.379  Already, California courts have 
had to determine whether publishers of online magazines, or       
“e-zines,” could claim protection under that state’s shield statute.380  
Judge Sentelle’s concurring opinion in the Judith Miller case also 
noted the possibility that courts would have a nearly impossible task 
in determining whether someone is a journalist given the rise of 
blogs and other new communication media.381  Journalists could 
 
 378. See supra text accompanying note 344. 
 379. See supra text accompanying note 352. 
 380. See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (finding that online magazine publishers qualify for shield law protection 
under California law). 
 381. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“Perhaps more to the point today, does the 
privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical “blogger” 
sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his 
best product to inform whoever happens to browse his way?  If not, why not?”). 
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counter that the federal circuits already have come up with a 
definition by determining that journalists are persons engaged in 
investigative reporting who had the intent, at the time information 
was gathered, of disseminating it to the public.382  Whether the 
Court would find that definition acceptable, too broad, or too 
narrow is open to conjecture. 
The question remains whether journalists should even try to 
persuade the Supreme Court to create a common-law privilege, 
given the worst-case scenario might wipe out the tenuous 
protection journalists have in federal courts now.  The answer is a 
qualified yes.  The Court is more likely to limit its holding to 
whatever facts are before it, so the worst-case scenario appears 
unlikely.  If a journalist or journalists take a grand jury subpoena 
case to the Court and it accepts, the Court is most likely to simply 
clarify its Branzburg holding.  Journalists might have a greater 
chance of success if the case involves information subpoenaed in a 
civil case in which the journalist and her employer are not parties.  
A civil case does not raise the important public policy or Sixth 
Amendment issues that exist in a criminal trial, nor does it run up 
against the “inevitable holding” of Branzburg in grand jury 
subpoena cases.383 
Ironically, and somewhat perversely, the worst-case scenario 
might actually make it easier to get a statutory privilege passed in 
Congress.  If journalists were stripped of whatever protection they 
have left in federal jurisdictions, this might persuade reluctant 
members of Congress that it is time to act. 
Several versions of a shield statute were introduced in the 
109th Congress and provided some clues as to what type of 
language might emerge should senators and representatives 
introduce new versions of the bills in the 110th Congress, which 
 
 382. See supra text accompanying note 298. 
 383. A recent ruling in a federal district court in Virginia would be a bad 
candidate for the Supreme Court because it involves a libel suit against the media.  
The New York Times was ordered to identify confidential sources used by columnist 
Nicholas D. Kristof in columns that allegedly defamed Steven J. Hatfill, a former 
scientist suspected of sending anthrax to a number of people in 2002.  See Jerry 
Markon, New York Times Columnist Must Reveal Sources, Judge Rules, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 24, 2006, at B3.  A case in which the news organization is a party and 
attempting to keep information from a libel plaintiff is unlikely to elicit much 
sympathy for the news organization.  See, e.g., Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 
822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005) (upholding default judgments against newspaper 
and reporter for refusing to reveal confidential source to plaintiff in libel and 
privacy action). 
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seems likely.384  Of the six shield bills under consideration in the 
House and Senate during the 109th Congress, five of them shared 
sponsors or language.  Senator Christopher Dodd, Democrat of 
Connecticut, introduced Senate Bill 369 (S. 369) in February 2005.  
Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, was the sponsor of 
Senate Bill 1419, which was identical to Representative Mike 
Pence’s House of Representatives Bill 3323 (H.R. 3323).385 Senator 
Lugar later introduced a new version, Senate Bill 2831 (S. 2831), 
but Representative Pence did not join him this time.  Given that S. 
2831 was the most recent version of Senator Lugar’s proposal and 
S. 369 went nowhere,386 it probably is necessary only to discuss S. 
2831 and H.R. 3323. 
The Lugar bill, S. 2831, would have created a qualified 
privilege for confidential source identities or confidential 
information subpoenaed by the government in criminal 
investigations.387  Disclosure could be compelled upon a showing by 
the government that the information was critical to an investigation 
or prosecution, relevant to the proceeding, unavailable elsewhere, 
and that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public 
interest in nondisclosure.388  Similar conditions on the privilege 
would apply when a journalist was subpoenaed by a criminal 
defendant or civil litigant.389  The Lugar bill contained several 
exceptions, including limitations on the privilege when the 
journalist was an eyewitness to a crime or involved in criminal or 
tortious activity;390 if the information was needed to prevent a death 
or substantial bodily injury;391 or in cases involving national 
security.392 
S. 2831 would have defined a “journalist” for purposes of the 
 
 384. See Zachary Coile, Key Lawmakers Urge Justice Department to Rescind Subpoenas 
of BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2007, at A1 (reporting that two members 
of Congress had asked the Justice Department to withdraw its subpoenas of two 
San Francisco Chronicle reporters and that they planned to use the case to back a 
push for a federal shield law in the new Congress). 
   385.  The Lugar and Pence bills were amended versions of earlier bills, Senate 
Bill 340 and House of Representatives Bill 581, which also were identical to each 
other. 
 386. Senator Dodd’s bill attracted only three co-sponsors.  See THOMAS 
(Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 387. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006). 
 388. Id. § 4(b)(1)–(6). 
 389. Id. §§ 5–6. 
 390. Id. § 7. 
 391. Id. § 8. 
 392. Id. § 9. 
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privilege as someone who was “engaged in gathering, preparing, 
collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, 
or publishing news or information” for one of the traditional news 
media, an Internet news service, or any other “professional medium 
or agency which has as 1 of its regular functions the processing and 
researching of news or information intended for dissemination to 
the public.”393  The Senate bill also would have required that the 
covered person work for “gain or livelihood” as a salaried employee 
or independent contractor for the news medium.394  The bill would 
therefore have excluded hobbyist bloggers and volunteer 
journalists unless their livelihood came from their journalistic 
activities. 
The Pence bill, H.R. 3323, would have given absolute 
protection against disclosure of confidential sources unless the 
information was needed in regard to a matter of national 
security.395  With regard to unpublished material such as notes and 
outtakes, the Pence bill would have provided qualified protection, 
with the qualifications differing depending upon whether the 
underlying case was criminal or civil.396  The Pence bill only would 
have limited the power of the executive and judicial branches to 
subpoena journalists, not Congress.397 
The Pence bill defined a “covered person” as any entity that 
“disseminates information by print, broadcast, cable, satellite, 
mechanical, photographic, electronic, or other means” through 
publishing a newspaper, book, magazine, or other periodical; 
through operating a radio or television broadcast station or 
network or cable system, satellite carrier, or providing 
programming via radio, television, cable, or satellite; the parent 
company of such an organization; or “an employee, contractor, or 
other person who gathers, edits, photographs, records, prepares, or 
disseminates news or information for such an entity.”398  The bill 
would have applied to any document created by the covered 
“persons” in writings, recordings, and photographs, as the terms 
are defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 1001.399 
If a bill similar to S. 2831 or H.R. 3323 passes in the 110th 
 
 393. Id. § 3(3). 
 394. Id. 
 395. Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2005). 
 396. Id. § 2 (a)(1)–(2). 
 397. Id. § 5(4). 
 398. Id. § 5(2)(A)–(C). 
 399. Id. § 5(3). 
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Congress, the effect would be similar to Supreme Court 
recognition of a common-law privilege.  A common-law privilege 
would also define the scope of the coverage, the persons who could 
claim its protection, and possibly any exceptions.  The difference 
would be that a statute would define the terms in relatively 
concrete and intractable ways, while a common-law privilege would 
allow flexibility.  The flip side of the equation is that a shield statute 
would provide more predictability for journalists, those who 
attempt to subpoena them, and their sources than would a 
common-law privilege that had to develop over time. 
In short, there is no easy answer for the problem of how to 
create a privilege for journalists that would protect them from 
subpoenas in a consistent manner across all federal appellate 
circuits.  Assuming that Congress does not suddenly leap to the 
defense of journalists by passing a shield statute in the early days of 
the 110th Congress, there may be time for journalists to attempt 
again to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize a common-law 
privilege.  Even if the Court refuses to do so, either by denying 
certiorari or by ruling in line with Branzburg, the statutory privilege 
option would still exist. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Given the outcomes in the Taricani, Miller, and Wen Ho Lee 
cases, and the uneven protection for journalists shielding their 
confidential sources among the federal appellate circuits, some sort 
of privilege is needed to maintain the free flow of information and 
journalists’ independence from government.  Of the recent cases, 
the Wen Ho Lee case might have been the most attractive vehicle for 
taking the issue to the Supreme Court in hopes of getting 
recognition for a common-law privilege that would bring 
consistency to federal law.  The problem of defining who would be 
covered by such a privilege, however, would have made the case 
difficult at best and could have resulted in an adverse ruling that 
would have left reporters worse off than they are now.  Another 
possible solution would be to persuade Congress to pass some sort 
of shield law that would serve the same purpose—consistency—
while leaving flexibility for the rapidly changing media landscape.  
Given the nature of the bills introduced in the 109th Congress, this 
also is not a perfect solution. 
If a shield law does not pass in the 110th Congress, one of the 
pending cases may make an attractive vehicle for getting the Court 
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to recognize a common-law privilege if media attorneys can 
persuade the Court to adopt a definition of “journalist” similar to 
the one that some federal circuits have already adopted.400  
Whether the Court would find that reason and experience dictate 
that it recognize such a privilege is anyone’s guess.  If not, the 
legislative alternative is still available to journalists.  There may, 
therefore, be nothing to lose in trying to persuade the Court that 
its Jaffee reasoning would apply to journalists as well as psychiatric 
social workers.  It is a gamble, but no bigger gamble than the ones 
that journalists and their sources take in the present legal climate 
when journalists promise to keep source identities confidential. 
 
    400.  As this article was being edited, two of the pending cases mentioned 
earlier came to conclusions. In regard to the subpoenaing of two San Francisco 
Chronicle reporters for their testimony about their source for secret grand jury 
transcripts in connection with the BALCO steroids investigation, the source came 
forward voluntarily, leading the government to drop subpoenas for the reporters.  
Bob Egelko & John Koopman, Lawyer Enters Guilty Plea as BALCO Leaker; 
Government Backs Off Reporters–They Avoid Prison Terms, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2007, 
at A1. In the other case, freelance videographer Josh Wolf, who served more time 
in prison for defying a subpoena than any American journalist in history, agreed 
to release disputed video footage of a San Francisco protest to a grand jury in 
return for a promise that he would not have to testify or identify anyone on the 
video.  Bob Egelko & Jim Herron Zamora, The Josh Wolf Case: Blogger Freed After 
Giving Video to Feds, S.F. CHRON., April 4, 2007, at B1.  
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